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ABSTRACT 
Research question: Within sport management, there is a lack of empirical research on the reasons 
why stakeholders mobilise. This article identifies four antecedent factors underpinning the formation 
of the Our Tottenham community network: a network formed by community groups in Tottenham to 
challenge, inter-alia, the stadium-led regeneration scheme. 
 
Research methods:  The research draws on a longitudinal, qualitative case study, involving interviews, 
participant observation of community meetings, and analysis of documents. 
 
Results and Findings: Four factors underpinned the development of the Our Tottenham community 
network. The erosion of local democracy and the violation of reciprocity are categorised as reactive 
forces, in which mobilisation occurred as a response to the behaviour of the Council and the football 
club. Protecting community interests and increasing salience were driven more by the needs of the 
community and are categorised as proactive forces underpinning mobilisation.     
 
Implications:  In the context of this case study, we argue that mobilising efforts occurred due to the 
presence of both reactive and proactive forces. This helped the Our Tottenham network to build a 
salient stakeholder coalition. The findings also suggest that focal organisations need to recognise how 
their behaviour can create the antecedent conditions for stakeholder mobilisation and put in place 
structures that enable community stakeholders to have a voice during stadium-led regeneration.  
 
Keywords (5): Community, mobilisation, regeneration, sport, stakeholder. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Stakeholder theory has a long and rich history in management and organisation studies 
(Laplume et al, 2008). It has also been used as a framework in many studies within sport management 
(e.g. Castro-Martinez & Jackson, 2015; Friedman & Mason, 2004; Leopkey & Parent, 2009). While this 
is due in part to the ‘emotional resonance’ of the stakeholder concept (Laplume et al, 2008, p.1153), 
it is also due to the way sport is embedded in social relations (Breitbarth & Harris, 2008: p.184). This 
reinforces the expectation that sport organisations, which often emphasise their community links, 
should engage seriously with their various stakeholders.  However, as will be seen in this article, this 
is not always the case and this in turn can lead to the mobilisation of groups of stakeholders.   
 
Mainstream stakeholder literature tends to focus on how firms identify, balance and manage 
the different interests of stakeholder groups (Laplume et al, 2008). However, there is one specific 
strand of research that seeks to understand stakeholder actions and responses and in particular how 
stakeholder networks seek to influence firms (e.g. Frooman, 1999). One of the key tenets of this body 
of research is that when stakeholder groups combine - stakeholder mobilisation - their collective 
influence on a firm is greater than their individual claims (Neville & Menguc, 2006). Given the 
prioritisation of private sector interests over citizenship and community interests (Warner and Clifton, 
2014), the mobilisation of local stakeholders is arguably more important now than previously. 
However, Hayibor and Collins (2016, p.351) state that ‘the conditions that predispose stakeholders to 
act against firms remain largely unexplored in the literature’.   
 
There is little empirical research that seeks to understand stakeholder mobilisation in sport 
management.  Although there has been some examination of civic campaigns in relation to sporting 
mega-events such as the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa (Cornelissen, 2012) and the 2007 Pan 
American Games in Rio de Janeiro (Curi et al., 2011),  there is limited theoretical understanding of the 
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factors that lead stakeholders to mobilise together with a lack of empirical research on how 
stakeholder networks initially come together, why they come together, and the extent to which these 
networks are able to influence a firm.  
 
This article seeks to identify the antecedent factors underpinning stakeholder mobilisation in 
the context of stadium-led regeneration, taking place in Tottenham. Sport-led regeneration schemes 
have the potential to alienate and marginalise community stakeholders (e.g. Golubchikov, 2017; Gray 
and Porter, 2015; Watt, 2013). To date, however, there is a lack of research on how community 
stakeholders respond to these developments and in particular on community stakeholder 
mobilisation. The article draws on a longitudinal empirical case study of the Our Tottenham network 
that formed in 2013. The network provided a mechanism through which local community groups in 
Tottenham were able to act in a coordinated manner to voice their opinions towards the planned 
changes brought about by the regeneration plans, with the new stadium for Tottenham Hotspur 
football club central to these.  
 
The article makes four contributions. First, it addresses the lack of empirical understanding of 
the antecedent factors that underpin stakeholder mobilisation in the context of stadium-led 
regeneration.  Four factors are identified and categorised as either reactive or proactive forces. 
Second, it demonstrates the importance that ‘interest intensity’ plays in mobilisation (Rowley & 
Moldovaneau, 2003), although we argue that the longer-term sustainability of this network relates to 
interest intensity and to social identity. Third, it shows in detail how both reactive and proactive forces 
help groups to build a salient stakeholder coalition. Fourth, it highlights that there are both 
instrumental and normative reasons for councils and private sector developers to enable community 
stakeholders to have a voice during the process of stadium-led regeneration.  
 
STAKEHOLDER MOBILISATION 
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Stakeholder activism involves various groups of stakeholders getting together to place 
pressure on, or influence organisations. Research, however, tends to focus on the concept of 
stakeholder networks from a focal organisation’s perspective. Rowley (1997), for example, argues that 
organisations do not respond to each stakeholder individually, but to the interaction of multiple 
influences from the entire stakeholder network. Frooman (1999) argues that stakeholder power can 
be determined by the nature of dependency and that the direction and extent of dependency 
determines the power advantage within a particular firm–stakeholder relationship. Specifically, a firm 
is more able to resist stakeholder pressures when it is a central player in its stakeholder network, when 
its stakeholder networks are less densely interconnected, and when there is low interdependence and 
firm power. Conversely, the existence of a dense stakeholder network can facilitate the formation of 
coalitions and densely tied stakeholder networks can constrain firms through creating the capacity to 
monitor organisations more efficiently and more effectively communicating information (Neville & 
Menguc, 2006). Peachey and Bruening (2011) demonstrate this effect through their research on 
organisational change in a Division I, Football Championship Subdivision athletic department in the 
US. Powerful alumni with dense networks successfully opposed the decision to discontinue the 
football programme through their mobilising efforts.  
 
While previous researchers have focused on how firms manage the different interests of 
stakeholder groups, others, such as Parmar et al. (2010), argue that stakeholder mobilisation needs to 
be understood from the point of view of those stakeholders involved in forming a coalition. This 
supports a fundamental question raised by Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003, p.204), namely ‘when do 
stakeholder groups take action?’ They argue that previous literature fails to explore the antecedent 
conditions that lead to stakeholder group mobilisation. Subsequent research also argues the need for 
further research on stakeholder alliances and more understanding of why members come together 
(Butterfield et al., 2004, Hayibor and Collins, 2016).  
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Hayibor and Collins (2016) argue there are a number of predictors of stakeholder mobilisation 
against a firm, with perceptions of fairness, or the degree of reciprocity between stakeholders and a 
firm the most widely cited reasons. This links with one of the key tenets of stakeholder management, 
which is the need to balance the multiple, conflicting demands of a wide range of stakeholders. If a 
particular stakeholder feels that they have been treated unfairly by a focal organisation and that the 
focal organisation is violating the fairness norms of reciprocity (Hayibor & Collins, 2016) then that 
particular stakeholder may seek to act against the firm. When there are sufficient numbers of 
stakeholders that feel a focal organisation is in violation of this fairness norm, this provides the 
impetus for stakeholders to mobilise to increase the strength of their response towards the firm 
(Neville & Menguc, 2006). However, as King argues (2008, p.27), ‘dissatisfaction does not 
automatically translate into the emergence of a salient stakeholder group’; there needs to be some 
degree of shared interest amongst stakeholders (Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003).  Others also argue for 
a more nuanced understanding, recognising the interplay between both an interest and an identity 
perspective. For example, de Bakker and de Hond (2008) point out that stakeholders may not be 
driven solely by a particular interest, nor by identity, leading to stakeholders targeting a firm for 
different reasons (interest or identify) at different points in time.  
 
The temporal element is reflected in the work of Mitchell et al. (1997), who identify the 
constructs of power, legitimacy and urgency as relevant for understanding stakeholder mobilisation. 
Stakeholders can clearly act individually, but they usually lack the ability (power) to change corporate 
behaviour. Indirect strategies, such as coalitions formed between stakeholder groups (Neville & 
Menguc, 2006), may allow stakeholders to combine their power, legitimacy and urgency in a way that 
enhances their salience, defined by Mitchell et al. (1997, p.854) as ‘the degree to which managers give 
priority to competing stakeholders’ claims’. Increased salience can improve the bargaining position of 
a stakeholder coalition vis-à-vis firms (Laplume, et al., 2008, p.1163).  
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SPORTS STADIUM REGENERATION AND STAKEHOLDER MOBILISATION 
 
Literature on community involvement in regeneration suggests it is not easy to balance wider 
community or stakeholder participation with successful developments (Henderson et al., 2007). It is 
also argued that regeneration agencies often limit participation to groups seen as legitimate, or most 
in tune with their objectives (Harvey & Schaefer, 2001); that it is difficult to find ‘representative’ 
community leaders; and that participation is often constrained by the belief of local people that they 
will not be listened to (Imrie & Raco, 2003; Jones, 2002).  Common criticisms of urban regeneration, 
of whatever type, include a failure to consult, and then, importantly, to allow participation by local 
communities and stakeholders.  This results in feelings that decisions are a fait accompli, with the local 
community only being consulted as a ‘rubber-stamp’ in the process.   
 
In the context of sport-led regeneration, there are similar concerns around the lack of 
democratic or political representation. For example, although a number of public meetings were held 
prior to the construction of Vancouver’s BC Place Stadium, these were primarily information sessions 
for the public and the community was prevented from gaining a vote in the process (Lee, 2002). 
Similarly, Jones’ (2002) research on the Millennium Stadium development in Cardiff highlights how 
local structures serving democracy and accountability were inadequate, while more recent research 
on the development of the Emirates Stadium showed that the stakeholder management strategy 
employed by the football club and local council was clearly aimed at engaging stakeholders, rather 
than providing any opportunities for participation in the decision-making process (Walters, 2011).   
 
Ignoring the local context could provide a trigger for local community stakeholders to take 
action through mobilisation (Colenutt and Cutten, 1994). This was a feature of the Sydney Olympic 
Games where protests and community meetings involving local resident groups and indigenous 
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people were held in the build up to the event (Nauright, 2004). However, mobilising efforts were not 
particularly successful in influencing decisions as ‘these voices were quickly silenced within Australian 
public debate’ (Nauright, 2004, p.1328). Similar findings have been shown in the context of the London 
Olympic site, where mobilising efforts against the compulsory purchase orders to relocate 201 small 
and medium enterprises and 425 residents of the Clays Lane Housing Estate were unsuccessful due to 
fragmentation (Fussey et al., 2012). Curi et al. (2011, p.151), however, provides some evidence of 
relative successes in mobilisation against developments proposed for the 2007 Pan American Games 
in Rio de Janeiro, but accepts that ‘if the civil society organization could avoid some interventions in 
public spaces, it was not strong enough to bring to the city a major legacy after the games’.    
 
This body of research emphasises the critical role that the wider political and institutional 
context plays in stadium-led regeneration. This is particularly relevant in the context of the UK. 
Following a period in which local democracy and decentralisation were placed at the centre of Labour 
government policy (Rydin & Thornley, 2002), recession and changes in government policy post-2010 
meant this went into reverse.  Austerity measures have had a disproportionate impact on the urban 
environment (Meegan et al., 2014), while the economics of austerity have been used as a Trojan horse 
to hasten the neo-liberal drive towards privatisation (Dillon and Fanning, 2015; Pugalis, 2016). This is 
the case particularly in the context of urban regeneration in which pre-eminence is given to economic 
factors (Pugalis, 2016), evidenced in the Minister for Decentralisation and Cities’ Statement on Growth 
in March 2011 that called for local authorities to review existing section 106 agreements on schemes 
that were deemed financially unviable. This reflects a changed institutional context and a move back 
towards a decentralised marketplace, with the downgrading of democracy and community 
involvement in regeneration (Colenutt et al., 2015: 1).  
 
These broader institutional changes are important when looking at stakeholder mobilisation, 
as democratic processes (or a lack of) can provide clear reasons why community stakeholder groups 
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may seek to mobilise. However, whilst many previous sport-related studies recognise the wider 
institutional context and the role it plays in alienating stakeholders, they also tend to describe specific 
issues, rather than looking at the factors that lead to stakeholder mobilisation, particularly in the 
context of community stakeholder mobilisation around stadium-led regeneration schemes.   
 
METHODS  
 
Case study background 
 
This article focuses on a case study of the Our Tottenham community network. The network 
of over 50 community groups was formed in spring 2013 in response to regeneration plans for 
Tottenham.  The stadium development at Tottenham Hotspur Football Club was the catalyst for the 
redevelopment and part of the Northumberland Development Project (NDP). It spans the period 
between the original planning application in 2010 and eventual approval of revised plans by Haringey 
Council in December 2015.  The main focal organisations involved in this development were Haringey 
Council and Tottenham Hotspur FC.  The Our Tottenham network of local community stakeholders 
sought to increase their participation in the process of stadium-led regeneration. This case represents 
an appropriate research site to better understand the antecedent factors that support the stakeholder 
mobilisation process.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE  
 
Data collection 
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Data was collected between December 2012 and December 20151 using semi-structured 
interviews, participant observation of meetings and other events (table 1) and analysis of secondary 
material. The interviews were one-to-one and each lasted between 40 and 90 minutes. It was 
important to interview a diverse group of stakeholders to obtain rich detail and for the validity of the 
study. For this reason, the choice of interviewees was based on a purposive sampling technique.  
Following the guidelines for purposeful sampling in choosing the initial respondents (Lincoln & Guba, 
1985), a snowball technique was used that involved asking those who were interviewed to 
recommend others who would provide relevant information for the study.  It follows from the above 
that not all of the individuals or organisations that were involved in this research were identified at 
the start of the process. All individuals that participated in the research were granted anonymity, 
although some spoke publicly and on the record through various media formats.   
 
The participant observation included meetings of the Our Tottenham network, meetings of 
Haringey Council, planning consultations in Tottenham, and public meetings of community groups, 
conferences and demonstrations and private and quasi-private meetings involving Tottenham 
Hotspur FC and a range of community group meetings in Tottenham.  Apart from public meetings, 
such as those of the local council, the participation was overt and all groups were informed of the lead 
researcher’s background and nature of the research.  However, it was recognised that in using 
participant observation there are a number of threats to reliability and validity.  The interviews and 
participant observation were triangulated with secondary data from a number of different sources, 
which included planning documents, newspaper reports, webcasts of local authority meetings, 
company annual reports, corporate communications, community publications and material from 
various social media formats such as on-line forums and blogs.  The secondary data sources were used 
to categorise, investigate, interpret and identify limitations of the primary data.  They also allowed for 
a richer picture than could be obtained from interviews and participant observation alone.   
                                                          
1 One later interview was conducted on 12.07.17. 
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INSERT TABLE 1 HERE  
 
Data analysis 
 
The analysis of the data was undertaken in a systematic manner and the process is set out in 
diagrammatic form in figure 2. The coding process was iterative and started once the majority of the 
interviews and participant observations had been completed.  Relevant concepts were identified, 
using the language of the respondents, and grouping direct quotations under different categories.  
This involved concepts linked to stakeholders’ views as expressed in interviews and meetings that the 
lead researcher attended as a participant observer. The researchers did this independently and then 
together produced a set of ‘first-order concepts’ (Gioia et al., 2013), bringing together material that 
demonstrates similarities based on what the interviewees were saying.  Following this, we grouped 
together the first order concepts into researcher-centric ‘second-order themes’ (Gioia et al., 2013). 
These themes provide more understanding and explanation of the reasons underpinning mobilisation. 
Some of these themes reflect previous research; others are novel and perhaps reflect the peculiarities 
of this particular case. Finally, we identified from these second-order themes a smaller number of 
‘aggregate dimensions’. These enabled us to build our data structure which helped us to construct the 
theoretical narrative around the antecedent factors that acted as triggers for stakeholders to mobilise 
through the Our Tottenham network. The four aggregate dimensions are used to structure the 
following findings section.   
 
The main purpose of this research was to identify the antecedent factors underpinning 
stakeholder mobilisation in the context of stadium-led regeneration.  It is recognised that conclusions 
drawn from this article are from a particular set of individuals, and also rest on the interpretations and 
constructions of the authors, and the results must be considered in this context.  It is clearly difficult 
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to generalise to other community groups, reflecting the methodological challenges in undertaking 
interpretive, case study research.  However, many of the features and processes relating to the 
mobilisation of the Our Tottenham network will share commonalities with other sites.     
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE  
 
FINDINGS 
 
The erosion of local democracy 
 
The first factor to emerge from the analysis is ‘the erosion of local democracy’. There was a 
perception that the traditional decision-making processes of local government that should take local 
communities into account were being circumvented in order to accommodate developers to push 
through the stadium and the regeneration plans. This is in part linked to the earlier discussion on the 
economics of austerity as evidenced in the interviews. For example, one interviewee referred to the 
process as ‘corporate-led regeneration’ that had resulted in Haringey Council attempting to retain 
their influence but having to work with ‘…big players like property developers, outsourcing companies, 
private companies and so on and selling off services and assets and land’ (interview with Tom, 
Tottenham resident and community activist). This was recognised as a ‘London-wide issue where 
there’s these large-scale developments all over London and the needs of local communities are kind 
of secondary or just ignored completely’ (interview with Alan, Tottenham resident and community 
activist).  
 
This erosion of local democracy was perceived in two ways. First, the view of many community 
stakeholders was that there was a failure to consult by both the football club and Haringey Council 
regarding the new stadium and the associated developments. For example, there was a prevailing 
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view amongst private property owners that ‘The High Road West community was never consulted 
over the demolition of their local shops and businesses’ (interview with Nic, local business owner, 
Tottenham).  Similarly, in a meeting between Tottenham Traders and Haringey Council it was said that 
‘There has been no engagement with local business about the development of this regeneration plan. 
We have been lied to and lied to by our own elected representatives. The key decisions for this master 
plan were made long before the consultation’ (Gilmaz, leading a deputation of Tottenham Traders to 
Haringey Council meeting, November 2013).  
 
The second example of the erosion of local democracy was that where consultation had taken 
place, it was perceived not to be genuine and that the consultations were in effect ‘a sham’. As one 
interviewee stated, ‘Now there’s all kinds of supposed consultations imperatives, but the trouble is 
they don’t actually take any notice of what people say if it conflicts with the council and the developers 
what they want to do’ (Interview with Tom, Tottenham resident and community activist). Equally, one 
interviewee stated that ‘They don’t understand that consultation doesn’t mean telling people what 
you’ve done after you’ve decided to do it’ (interview with John, supporter of THFC and Journalist). For 
example, the only way that many in the local community became aware of Haringey Council’s High 
Road West regeneration plans, linked to the new stadium development, was through community 
meetings, leaflets, word of mouth and the local media: ‘So I went in to the library on Saturday and got 
Turkish copies and photo-copied the hell out of them and started distributing them and told them to 
tell everyone……. So this is why we’re trying to let people know, to use their voice, disagree’ (Interview 
with Lara, resident and business owner, Tottenham).   
 
The perceived ‘sham’ consultation, and the fact that the local community had to step in to 
inform others of planned developments, provoked discontent and anger amongst communities in 
Tottenham, which in turn acted as a mechanism for mobilisation: ‘All over Tottenham people are 
challenging different aspects, different projects, different sites that are under threat, proposing 
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alternatives, defending existing set-ups’ (Interview with Tom, Tottenham resident and community 
activist). One resident specifically credited the council’s ‘rhetoric’ about consultations with 
encouraging the formation of groups such as Our Tottenham and much of the resulting dissent and 
protest: ‘They spout rhetoric and pay lip service to local consultations in such an obvious patronising 
way that they have created and encouraged the formation of the Our Tottenham movement that is 
growing and growing’ (local resident, Tottenham, participant observation in community meeting, July 
2013).  Ultimately, the creation of the Our Tottenham network drew on the anger and discontent 
brought about by the erosion of local democracy to encourage community groups to mobilise.  
 
A Violation of Reciprocity 
 
The second factor underpinning mobilisation was the violation of reciprocity between the 
focal organisations, Haringey Council and Tottenham Hotspur FC, and the local community. This 
related firstly to the lack of transparency around both the development plans and the focal 
organisations.  This included a lack of access to council documents, the representation of local views, 
viability reports that were not made public, the work of groups such the Tottenham Landowners and 
Major Businesses Group, and the relationship between Haringey Council and Tottenham Hotspur FC.  
‘I’ve never seen anything so diseased and secret.  It’s almost as if we are working for Spurs’ (interview 
with Peter ex-local councillor, Haringey). Additionally:    
 
‘What really pisses me off is the secrecy.  I got an offer to view a document, but on the basis 
of secrecy.  I said what needs to happen is all of it should be in the public domain so people 
can see what’s going on.  I was offered a meeting, but it would be private and confidential’ 
(Haringey, participant observation in meeting, July 2013).    
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Alongside the lack of transparency, there were clear concerns amongst business owners in 
particular that underhand tactics were being used by the council and the football club. Whilst this was 
manifest through very strong feelings, ‘Tottenham are basically blackmailing the council’ (Interview 
with local business owner, Franco, Tottenham), one local business owner explained how she was 
offered the opportunity to sell her business in 2009 at below the market rate:   
 
‘So they came along and they made a lot of offers that were ridiculous.  I think they viewed 
the shop as not very important and probably thought they could buy it for under market value.  
So my agent wrote to them and said this was ridiculous, it’s not even half the value.  And the 
guy wrote back: ‘it’s only a minor advantage to us to get the shop early.  We will be able to 
obtain it with CPOs later anyway’ (Interview with Paula, local business owner, Tottenham). 
 
The use of CPOs (compulsory purchase orders) as a threat to obtain ownership at a later date 
in order to knock down and rebuild can be argued to be an example of an underhand tactic designed 
to pressurise business owners into selling. This provoked a response amongst business owners: ‘Do 
you agree this is injustice? Then please take action and support us by writing to your ward councillors 
and any prospective candidates to ask them to oppose these demolition plans’ (Tottenham Business 
Group, 2014). At the same time, the underhand way in which the football club and local authority had 
dealt with the threat of demolition created anger. As one interview revealed: ‘What, you’re going to 
knock those down’?  We’re not having that.  And it’s almost that you cause people to dig their heels 
in’ (interview with Mick, THFC supporter).  This was further evidenced in a petition against the High 
Road West plans to Haringey Council: ‘More than 1,800 people from the N17 area alone signed our 
petition… 20 times the figure used by the council as a mandate to demolish’ (stated in community 
meeting in Tottenham, September, 2013).  These examples show that the underhand tactics also 
provoke anger and act as a mechanism for mobilising.  
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One particularly contentious issue was the council’s decision to revise the original planning 
agreement to reduce Tottenham Hotspur FC’s Section 106 community infrastructure payments from 
over £16 million to just £477,000 and release it from a 50% affordable housing requirement for 
property built on the existing football ground; at the time, the football club was negotiating to sell a 
player for 100 million Euros. These examples helped to fuel the perception that the football club and 
the council were acting together in an underhand manner and coupled with the perceived lack of 
transparency, led to the feeling that the local community stakeholders were not being treated fairly. 
As such, the perception of unfair treatment through these two constructs suggests that the norms of 
reciprocity were being violated and this is the second factor underpinning the mobilisation of the Our 
Tottenham network.  
 
Protecting community interests 
 
The third factor underpinning the mobilisation of the Our Tottenham network was the 
protection of community interests. Concerns around social engineering and gentrification support 
this.  Local residents and business owners in Tottenham expressed views in meetings that ‘it’s not 
regeneration, that’s social engineering’, and that ‘social cleansing’ and ‘gentrification’ were taking 
place around them as part of the wider regeneration linked to the new stadium. One individual at a 
street assembly (observation, July 2013) described the new stadium as a ‘Trojan horse for 
gentrification’, while one interviewee stated that ‘The plans delivered won’t be for present residents, 
for people who presently live here.  It will be for a socially cleansed area.  It will be.  We know that’ 
(Interview with Lara, local resident and business owner). This view was also seen in a webcast of the 
meeting of the Overview and Security Committee of Haringey Council in November 2013, where 
Councillor Bull stated:  
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‘But you don't have to be close to the detail of the stadium plans or the wider place-changing 
agenda to be alarmed by what is proposed. Simply knowing that the plan involves bulldozing 
through shops on the High Road, council homes on the Love Lane Estate, and demolishing a 
public library for a fans’ walkway tells you all you need to know about its social cleansing 
drive’. 
  
Further evidence to support this could be seen in the reneging on the original section 106 
community infrastructure commitments that had been included in the initial approval granted by 
Haringey Council’s Planning Committee in 2010 (mentioned above). Following the riots that occurred 
in Tottenham in the summer of 2011, the Mayor of London announced in January 2012 over £41 
million in funding and investment for the area. Linked to this new funding package, in February 2012 
the Planning Committee of Haringey Council agreed significant changes to reduce the cost and 
increase the realisable value of the stadium development.  This largely involved reducing the football 
club’s funding obligations from £16 million to £477,000 and allowing an increase in the number of 
residencies to be built on the existing ground to 285 (up from 200, but the eventual figure agreed was 
585 in December 2015), all of which would be sold on the open market.    
 
In community and council meetings, council representatives were very keen for phrases such 
as ‘social engineering’ and ‘social cleansing’ not to become part of the discourse linked with 
regeneration in Tottenham. Many local people also believed, perhaps correctly given the institutional 
context outlined above, that large landowners generally had greater influence at the local council than 
other stakeholders such as local residents and the owners of smaller businesses were excluded from 
participation in the regeneration plans (personal interviews with the author).   The context of 
perceived negative social and community impacts that local stakeholders in Tottenham felt, including 
fear and stress for their own futures, provided a strong trigger for the mobilisation of the Our 
Tottenham network in order to protect their interests: ‘We say this to Tottenham residents: Beware! 
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We are at the forefront of this process. Your turn is coming next. Get involved now, be aware that 
area plans are already made, and question everything in this process’ (leaflet from Our Tottenham, 
2013).  
 
There was also the desire for the community to be part of the regeneration rather than a top-
down process dominated by property development interests.  This was explicitly demonstrated by the 
fact that the Our Tottenham network put forward their own ‘Community Plan for Tottenham’ partly 
in response to Haringey Council’s ‘Plan for Tottenham’ that many felt did not take into account the 
views of the local community. These concerns led to the mobilisation of the Our Tottenham network 
to protect community interests.   
 
Increasing salience 
 
The fourth factor underpinning the mobilisation of stakeholders in the Our Tottenham 
network was the perceived lack of salience felt by community stakeholders.  For many of the residents 
and business owners that lived and worked across the road from the existing stadium, the realisation 
of their lack of individual power came from the High Road West consultation in spring 2013.  The 
consultation included major plans for demolition of social housing as well as private homes and 
businesses on the opposite side of Tottenham High Road to the proposed new stadium: ‘They can’t 
just take our factory and our land, which we have built over so many years’ work, to build flats to make 
money; surely that is theft?’ (interview with Nic, local business owner, Tottenham). It was also decided 
by the council that a petition containing over four thousand names that was gathered together by 
local businesses and residents could not form part of the formal consultation process, providing 
further evidence of the community’s lack of power:  ‘We are people that contribute greatly to the 
community, but we are being pushed out of the area we were born and raised in, Tottenham, and 
punished for not fitting in with the new plans’ (interview with Lara, local resident and business owner). 
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Similarly, one interviewee stated that ‘It just seems like private discussions are going on in the world 
of high finance and we’re not really going to have much influence over it’ (interview with Paula 
Tottenham resident and business owner).  
 
The realisation of their lack of individual power led stakeholders to recognise the need to 
mobilise in order to try to influence the development and thus this was another factor underpinning 
the formation of the Our Tottenham network. There was an understanding that individuals, and 
individual groups, could not challenge such a major strategy on their own: ‘I think that any person that 
takes on big organisations needs to be in a group. It doesn’t matter how strong, smart, savvy, 
knowledgeable you are, you cannot do it on your own’ (interview with Mia, local resident, and 
community activist). This was also recognised in an interview with a local councillor, Ali, who argued 
that ‘you can’t just have different individuals springing up from everywhere and saying I represent 
that group and I represent that group whereas it’s just themselves with one or two concerns.  So you 
have to have established groups’.  
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The preceding case study of the Our Tottenham network identifies four factors that provide a 
stronger theoretical understanding of the conditions that prompt community stakeholders to mobilise 
around a stadium-led regeneration scheme. We categorise these as either reactive or proactive (figure 
3).  
 
Reactive factors: (i) the erosion of local democracy and (ii) violation of reciprocity  
 
The first two factors emerged due to the perceived behaviour of Haringey Council and the 
football club towards local communities in Tottenham. The interviews and observations revealed that 
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the failure to take into account local communities in regard to the stadium development and the 
broader regeneration of Tottenham was perceived as an erosion of local democracy.  This was felt 
through a failure to consult by both the football club and Haringey Council and that any consultations 
were a ‘sham’.  In part, it can be argued that this was linked to the cuts faced by Haringey Council as 
a result of austerity that was allowing private development companies to move into the space once 
occupied by the public sector (Deas and Doyle, 2013).  However, the use of sport mega-events to 
implement economic projects that interfere with public space for private advantage has been noted 
elsewhere (Curi et al., 2011).  Expressions such as ‘it’s a completely fraudulent consultation’, related 
to the High Road West plans, evidence the strong emotions that were undoubtedly drivers towards 
mobilisation for some in Tottenham.    
 
At the same time, there were concerns that the focal organisations’ behaviour was in violation 
of the norms of reciprocity (Hayibor and Collins, 2016).  In this case, this dimension was made up of a 
perceived lack of transparency and underhand tactics.  This echoes research that has looked at the 
governance of regeneration projects linked to sports such as the Olympic Stadium in London, which 
has been criticised for being opaque and lacking democratic controls (Minton, 2012) together with the 
Pan American Games in Rio in 2007 where a lack of transparency was a constant problem (Curi et al., 
2011).  In Tottenham we had clear views that the regeneration process was ‘diseased and secret’ and 
this was clearly a motivating factor for some people to mobilise.  The notion of the local community 
as the beneficiary in such circumstances becomes a highly contested entity (Fussey et al., 2012: 279).  
 
These two antecedent factors were created by the actions of the focal organisations and had 
a direct mobilising effect on local community stakeholders. They are past and present focused, and, 
as such, figure 3 sets out how these two factors are categorised as reactive in that stakeholder 
mobilisation through the Our Tottenham network occurred as a response, or reaction, to the 
perceived behaviour of these organisations.  
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INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE  
 
Proactive factors: (iii) protecting community interests and (iv) increasing salience 
 
King (2008) argues that dissatisfaction amongst community stakeholder groups does not 
automatically mean that mobilisation will occur or that a salient stakeholder group will emerge. In this 
sense, the reactive factors by themselves might not be enough for mobilisation to occur. The two 
additional factors that emerged from the research: the protection of community interest and the 
increase in salience – contrast to the previous two in that these were not a direct, immediate response 
to the behaviour of the football club and Haringey council.  
 
The protection of community interests reflected strongly held views that social engineering 
and gentrification were taking place in Tottenham and as result of this there was a need to put forward 
community-led development plans.  The exclusion of competing groups linked to stadium-building has 
been found in previous research (Collins, 2008; Lee, 2002), although not explicitly linked to 
mobilisation.  The need for decision-making by community, resident, supporter and business 
representatives for successful stadium-led developments has also been argued by Brown et al (2004).  
However, Fussey et al., (2012: 265) note the long history of ‘cleansing’ and ‘purifying’ strategies in 
urban management.  The feeling that the stadium-led regeneration plans were not for the existing 
community, but for a ‘socially cleansed area’, were again strong drivers towards mobilisation for many 
local people in Tottenham.  
 
The need to mobilise to develop increased salience reflects ways in which community 
interests were given attention, or perceived to be ignored.  There was a realisation of the lack of 
individual power and therefore of the need to work together. There is evidence here that people 
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recognised the need for dense stakeholder networks that can facilitate the formation of coalitions 
(Rowley, 1997).  Relative successes in defeating some aspects of sport-led regeneration projects as far 
apart as Rio (Curi et al., 2011) and Edinburgh (Reid, 2014) have been linked with sometimes loosely 
tied coalitions that are able to mobilise around ‘problematic interventions in the city’s landscapes’ 
(Curi et al., 2011: 148). Thus, the sporting element of any regeneration can provide the interest 
intensity necessary for effective mobilisation.   Those affected by potential demolition of their homes 
or businesses by developments linked to the building of the new stadium in Tottenham particularly 
found it hard to understand their lack of salience.  In those circumstances these individuals looked to 
mobilise together in groups such as Our Tottenham.   These dimensions are also not past or present 
focused, but are future focused and are categorised as proactive in that the community stakeholders 
recognised the need to mobilise (and formalise) to ensure there was a mechanism through which the 
various community stakeholders could put forward changes for the future benefit of the community.   
 
Implications 
 
These four factors are not mutually exclusive. For example, the erosion of local democracy (a 
reactive, past/present force) is very much linked to the protection of community interests, which is 
proactive and future focused. Therefore there are clear relationships between these factors and they 
are interlinked. In the context of this particular case study, we argue that mobilising efforts occurred 
due to the strong presence of both reactive and proactive forces. Reactive forces helped to underpin 
mobilising efforts through engendering a feeling of anger amongst stakeholders and serve to create 
an ‘us versus them’ situation.  This anger was then channelled through proactive processes that served 
to give focus to the development of forward thinking approaches that seek to address community 
stakeholder needs. Together, these forces played an important role in mobilising efforts. It could be 
argued that without both forces present, the mobilisation of the Our Tottenham network may not 
have occurred. This finding has implications for community stakeholders seeking to mobilise to act 
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against a firm. If there is not significant community anger due to perceived violations of reciprocity 
and concerns around the erosion of local democracy, then it may be difficult for community groups to 
mobilise sufficiently to achieve greater salience.  Community stakeholder mobilisation is therefore 
dependent on the recognition of the past and present behaviour of a focal organisation, but to achieve 
salience, it also requires forward thinking approaches and strategies that recognise the future 
objectives and goals of the community.  
 
This finding also has implications for focal organisations in the context of stadium-led 
regeneration. They need to recognise how their behaviour can create the conditions for stakeholder 
mobilisation against the firm through reactive measures. As such, it provides an instrumental 
justification for the focal organisation to ensure that they take local community stakeholders into 
account during stadium regeneration through the implementation of governance structures that allow 
for involvement in decision-making by communities and that ensure there is regular information 
sharing about the stadium development. Engaging local communities and involving them in the 
development would make it less likely that people would feel that reciprocity had been violated or 
local democracy undermined; as a result it is less likely to lead to reactive forces being present, which 
in turn may inhibit mobilising efforts to act against a focal organisation. At the same time, however, 
there is also a more important normative, or moral reasoning, underpinning the decision to engage 
community stakeholders in stadium regeneration. It can be argued that implementing democratic 
structures is necessary to ensure that the views of local community stakeholders are heard and to 
demonstrate that there are clear efforts to ensure accountability towards those affected.  
 
The reactive and proactive antecedent conditions underpinning this model relate to the 
interest aspect of stakeholder mobilisation. However, Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003) argued that the 
interest focused perspective cannot offer a complete picture given that it does not account for why 
some stakeholder groups will pursue a lost cause or engage in action when there is little prospect of 
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them achieving benefits. Despite the recognition of the role of social identity and the concept of an 
imagined community (Blakeley & Evans, 2009), there was little to suggest that the mobilisation of the 
Our Tottenham network occurred for these reasons. However, this could be due to the specificities of 
the case and in particular, the fact that mobilisation occurred in part as a reaction to focal organisation 
behaviour (creating the ‘us versus them’ situation) perhaps could be a reason as to why social identify 
did not play a role in mobilising. Nevertheless, it can also be argued that mobilisation is an ongoing 
process; it does not simply end when the network has formed as mobilising efforts continue (i.e. 
through reaching out to other stakeholder groups in order to increase salience).  
 
It could be argued however, that whilst the network formed due to interest intensity, the 
sustainability of this network is now related to interest intensity and to social identity. For example, it 
was stated that ‘The only good thing to come from this consultation is that the community has become 
a bit closer, but we’re all still worried’ (interview with Paula, local resident and business owner, 
Tottenham).  This suggests there are now social identity processes at play following the mobilisation 
of the Our Tottenham network. This aligns with the argument of de Bakker and de Hond (2008) who 
suggest that stakeholders may target a firm for different reasons (interest or identity) at different 
points in time. We would suggest that in the context of the Our Tottenham network, mobilisation 
occurred for interest reasons and that moving forward, a sense of social identify also comes into play. 
However, this is an area for further research. In a related example, unintended but positive effects 
have been found in Rio, resulting from development related to the 2016 Olympic Games. As journalist 
Julia Michaels states, ‘The positive legacies aren't any of the ones that were stated or intended … but 
civil society is more networked, more aware. People in favelas are angry.  I think the poor started to 
change the way they view themselves’. This has led to a sense of empowerment and that those living 
in favelas are not as easily ‘pushed to the side’ (Michaels, in Purcell, 2017). The findings from this case 
study of the Our Tottenham network are similar; the mobilising efforts have increased the 
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community’s awareness, willingness and capability to act against future regeneration developments 
undertaken by Haringey council.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This is one of the first articles to undertake empirical research focusing on the factors that 
underpin stakeholder mobilisation in the context of sport stadium-led regeneration. It builds on the 
earlier analysis of civic campaigns around sporting mega-events (Cornelissen, 2012, Curi et al., 2011) 
but, more importantly, provides a greater understanding of the antecedent factors as to why 
community stakeholders mobilise, how they come together and the extent of their influence.  The 
reactive and proactive categorisations explain in a more theoretically informed way the nature of the 
conditions that ‘predispose stakeholders to act against firms’ (Hayibor and Collins, 2016, p351) and 
how they can be used by community groups to build a salient stakeholder coalition.  The findings also 
demonstrate the importance that ‘interest intensity’ plays in mobilisation (Rowley & Moldovaneau, 
2003), although the longer-term sustainability of this network relates to interest intensity and to social 
identity. Further research on the mobilisation of community networks could provide more 
understanding of whether these findings are present in other contexts that would aid their 
transferability. Moreover, there is a need for a better understanding as to the types of strategies and 
tactics used by community groups once mobilised in order to seek influence on focal organisations. 
 
We thank the two anonymous reviewers for their very helpful comments together with those 
of the special edition editors and for their support throughout. 
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Figure 2: Data structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-It just seems like private discussions are going on in the world of high finance and we’re not really 
going to have much influence over it 
How can they make plans about my property when I don’t intend sell? How can you make plans 
about my property?  How can I make any plans for the future?   
I have lived in Tottenham all my life. I have never been scared, not until I saw these plans. The 
uncertainty and strain it has put on our family and neighbours is awful. 
Everyone is being pushed out.  We’re not making the decisions, it’s big business. 
 
- I think it is those networks probably that are missing or lacking in that part of Tottenham 
-They weren’t expecting us to come, so we took as many people as we could 
-I think that any person that takes on big organisations needs to be in a group 
-We’ve started to overcome the kind of isolation and fragmentation of a whole range of different 
groups and campaigns that aren’t encouraged to link up and support each other 
Underhand tactics  
Lack of individual power 
-And no they weren’t happy.  No one was happy.  They felt hood-winked into thinking it was just a 
Sainsbury’s.  A Sainsbury’s and a stadium.   
-They can’t vote against the whole plan; that’s why it was intellectually dishonest, the whole 
bloody thing, because you weren’t allowed to say ‘nothing’. -And the guy wrote back: ‘it’s only a 
minor advantage to us to get the shop early.  We will be able to obtain it with CPOs later anyway’ 
I’ve been a Labour Party member for 40 years, lived here for 30 years and been a councillor for 16 
years.  I’ve never seen anything so diseased and secret.  It’s almost as if we are working for Spurs. 
 
The need to work together  
Increasing salience 
 
Social engineering and 
gentrification 
Protecting community interests 
 
A violation of reciprocity  
 
The plans delivered won’t be for present residents, for people who presently live here.  It will be 
for a socially cleansed area.  It will be.  We know that. 
It’s a new community.  They are thinking 50 years ahead.  They are not thinking about us 
Spurs’ stadium is being used as a Trojan horse for gentrification. 
We don’t fit in to the plans of Sainsbury’s, Spurs or the council. 
 
 
 
 
A lack of (genuine) consultation 
A lack of transparency  
They don’t understand that consultation doesn’t mean telling people what you’ve done after 
you’ve decided to do it. 
Now there’s all kinds of supposed consultations imperatives, but the trouble is they don’t actually 
take any notice of what people say if it conflicts with the council and the developers what they 
want to do 
I mean a perfect example is Love lane Estate.  They didn’t ask.  It’s a completely fraudulent 
consultation exercise 
 
First order concepts Second order themes Aggregate dimensions 
Erosion of local democracy  
 
-We drew a close to the initiative in the end, because the club weren’t letting us say anything at all 
about what we were discussing 
-What really pisses me off is the secrecy.  I got an offer to view a document, but on the basis of 
secrecy. 
-I said what needs to happen is all of it should be in the public domain so people can see what’s 
going on. 
 
 
Community-led development 
Failing to consult   
The High Road West community was never consulted over the demolition of their local shops and 
businesses. 
There has been no engagement with local business about the development of this regeneration 
plan 
Tottenham people look after this area.  If they want to smarten Tottenham up a little bit, tell the 
people who own the shops, give them some tax relief to paint the fronts. 
The Council’s Plan for Tottenham does not generally represent what local people need or want 
We wanted to see community-led projects and regeneration led by the community 
We think it should be done like Our Tottenham.  It should be with the community and for the 
community 
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Figure 3: Antecedent factors underpinning community stakeholder mobilisation 
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Table 1: Data Sources 
 
Interviews 
(14 interviews) 
Observations 
(28 full meetings) 
Local councillors, London borough of 
Haringey (4 separate interviews) 
Local business owners (4 separate 
interviews) 
Local resident and community activists (3 
separate interviews) 
Education consultant 
Parliamentary assistant 
Supporter of THFC and Journalist 
 
Community group, Tottenham (18 
meetings) 
Business group, Tottenham(2 meetings) 
Planning consultation, Tottenham 
Street assembly, Tottenham 
Street rally, outside Haringey Council 
meeting 
Meeting of Haringey Council full cabinet 
Community conference, Tottenham 
THFC ‘fun day’ 
THFC v CPFC community street assembly 
Haringey Council Planning sub-committee 
 
 
